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Mullman: Maney v. Ratcliff

MANEY v. RATCLIFF
LAW-Fourth Amendment-Computerized Law
Enforcement Records-Where an individual is subjected to repeated arrests as a result of an NCIC entry, there is a violation
of the fourth amendment cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 399
F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
CONSTITUTIONAL

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized index of individuals' criminal records and of outstanding
fugitive from justice warrants, was designed by Congress to provide assistance to state law enforcement agencies.' In Maney v.
Ratcliff2 the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
considered the issues raised by allegations of misuse of the system. The plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19833 against
the Chief of Police of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a police officer, the
District Attorney for the East Baton Rouge Parish, and an assistant district attorney.
The suit challenged the defendants' use of the NCIC in locating and causing the detention of the plaintiff for extradition to
Louisiana. The defendants had placed a fugitive from justice
entry into the system on the basis of an arrest warrant issued in
May 1973. The warrant charged Maney with the felonious distribution of marijuana in February of that year.4 As a result of this
entry, Maney was jailed on three separate occasions, twice in
Wisconsin and once in New York. In each instance, after the
1. See generally SUBCOMM.

ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE

JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL DATA BANKS].
Statutory authority for the NCIC is found in 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1971), which provides
in pertinent part:
(a) The Attorney General shall(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal
identification, crime, and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, the states, cities, and penal
and other institutions.
2. 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress.
4. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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plaintiff was stopped for an unrelated purpose, a routine NCIC
check revealed the existence of the fugitive from justice warrant.
Although the Baton Rouge authorities twice indicated that they
desired extradition and that they would forward the necessary
papers, these papers were never forwarded; after each of the three
arrests, the plaintiff was eventually released. Although they
failed to take the steps necessary to secure extradition, the defendants nevertheless neglected to remove the entry requesting the
plaintiff's detention as a fugitive. 5 After his third arrest, Maney
brought suit against the Baton Rouge officials for injunctive relief
and compensatory and punitive damages.6

Before ruling on the substantive claim, the court considered
the defendants' procedural objections involving venue,7 personal
jurisdiction, 8 prosecutorial immunity,9 mootness,10 and absten5. Id. at 773.
6. Id. at 764.
7. Venue in federal courts is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1971). Since none of the
defendants resided in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the court proceeded to analyze
the claims. It concluded that each arrest constituted a separable claim of violation of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights and, analogizing the alleged section 1983 violations to
tort claims, held that the cause of action arose where the injury occurred. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 766-67 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The court therefore held that venue was
proper for the two Wisconsin arrests but dismissed, with approval of the plaintiff, the third
claim involving events that took place in New York. Id. at 767.
8. The court concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants by virtue
of the Wisconsin long-arm statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05(4) (Supp. 1975), and thus
rejected the defendants' argument that the statute "was not intended to apply to the use
of the NCIC system by police and prosecutors . . .

."

Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp.

760, 767-68 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The court held that the defendants' conduct constituted
adequate "minimum contacts. . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "Id., quoting International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
9. In dealing with the motion to dismiss by defendants Brown and Chaffin, the court
was confronted with the issue of prosecutorial immunity. The court analyzed the Maney
facts to determine whether the conduct of the defendants was "quasi-judicial as opposed
to investigatory activit[y] normally performed by laymen, such as police officers."
Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 770 (E.D. Wis. 1975), citing Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974). The court
held that the initial decision to extradite was a quasi-judicial function, but concluded that
the decision to leave the entry in the NCIC after deciding not to extradite was outside
the scope of prosecutorial immunity. Therefore, not all of Assistant District Attorney
Chaflin's conduct was protected from the plaintiff's claim for damages. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 770 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
After the Maney decision, the Supreme Court considered the issue of prosecutorial
immunity in Imbler v. Pachtman, 44 U.S.L.W. 4250 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976). The Court held
that prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil actions for damages brought under
section 1983. Basing its decision on the common law immunity afforded to prosecutors,
the Court found that to provide anything less than an absolute bar to such actions "would
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tion." The court concluded that none of these claims was fatal to
the suit. Reaching the merits, the court held that the complaint
stated a cause of action and issued a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to remove the NCIC entry and restraining
another entry during the pendency of the action. 2
To come within the scope of section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that he or she has been deprived of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution by one acting under color
of state law. 3 If both elements are established, the statute
authorizes legal and equitable remedies. 4 The Maney court found
that the plaintiffs complaint was sufficient to make out a15 prima
facie violation of his rights under the fourth amendment.
prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." Id. at 4256. The Court, however,

specifically refrained from deciding whether this absolute immunity applied to "aspects
of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrative or investigative officer rather than an advocate." Id. at 4257. Therefore, the Maney court's holding
that the original entry of the warrant was quasi-judicial in nature is still of legal significance.
Throughout NCIC policy statements, the local law enforcement agency is considered
to be the party responsible for entering and ensuring the accuracy of NCIC information.
See, e.g., FEDERAL DATA BANKS, supra note 1, at 2218. Since this function is an "investigatory activit[y] normally carried out by laymen such as police officers," (Hampton v. City
of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)), it appears
that immunity should not attach at all.
10. On plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order during the pendency of
the action, the court dealt with problems of mootness and abstention. The court noted
that although the defendants had voluntarily removed the entry from the NCIC, they were
nevertheless "free to return to [their] old ways." Maney v. Ratcliff, 339 F. Supp. 760,
771 (E.D. Wis. 1975), quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
The court held that since the issue was not moot, it was obligated to protect against any
future violations. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 771 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
11. The plaintiff's request for orders restraining future prosecution and requiring the
removal of the NCIC entry raised the issue of abstention. Relying on Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975), the court found that there
was a failure to demonstrate a showing of bad faith and therefore denied the plaintiffs
motion to restrain the pending criminal proceeding. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760,
772 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The court held that since the defendants knew of the plaintiff's
whereabouts, the removal of the NCIC entry and an order restraining its re-entry would
not interfere with an extradition request. The court further noted that a fundamental
principle of the abstention doctrine "is that the federal plaintiff will be able to assert his
constitutional rights in the state criminal prosecution." Id. at 772-73. Since there was no
guarantee that the defendants would ever extradite and thereby provide the plaintiff with
a forum, the court held that the Younger doctrine would not prohibit enjoining the NCIC
entry.
12. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 774 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 3 supra.
14. Id.
15. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 773 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The fourth amendment
provides:
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In the court's analysis, the arrests constituted unreasonable7
seizures. The court cited Terry v. Ohio6 and Wolf v. Colorado
to support the proposition that the fourth amendment guarantees
the right "to be free from arbitrary and unreasonable interference
by police."'" Apparently, the Maney court read Wolf and Terry
as establishing the principle that the fourth amendment proscribes all reprehensible police conduct. There is little in either
opinion to support this construction. 9
In both Wolf and Terry the Supreme Court considered
whether the police had probable cause upon which to actwhether the underlying facts were sufficient to justify the intrusions. In Terry, the petitioner sought reversal of a state conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. He alleged that the trial
court improperly admitted evidence obtained after the police had
frisked him in the absence of probable cause to believe that he
had committed a crime. The Court concluded that the police
officer's concern for his own safety justified the minimally intrusive search for weapons. 2 It held that the fourth amendment's

"general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures" 2' was not offended and that admission of the evidence was
therefore not improper.
In Maney, probable cause was not at issue. The question
considered by the court was whether repeated arrests for the same
offense are unreasonable seizures within the meaning of the
fourth amendment even if each arrest is supported by probable
cause. The Terry Court's references to reasonableness, however,
related solely to justification to search and seize. There was no
question of prosecutorial intent. Thus, the Maney court's reliance
on Terry was at least questionable.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
18. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 773 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
19. The Terry Court specifically noted that "the issue is not the abstract propriety
of the police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered
by the search and seizure." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
20, Id. at 30.
21, Id. at 20.
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The inappropriateness of an application of a fourth amendment analysis to the facts of Maney is further demonstrated by
the court's reliance on Marland v. Heyse," a Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision. The plaintiff in Marland was arrested on
three separate occasions but never prosecuted. The Maney court
cited Marland to support the proposition that multiple arrests in
the absence of prosecution constitute a violation of the fourth
amendment. 23 Although the Marland court did find that the
plaintiff's constitutional rights had been violated, this conclusion
did not rest on the fact of repeated arrests as the Maney court
had suggested. The violation in Marland was the fact that the
plaintiff was arrested on the "different occasions" 24 in the absence of probable cause. Thus, the view that multiple arrests
without prosecution constitute a fourth amendment violation is
not supported by Marland.
The Maney court also cited Jenkins v. Averett.2 The petitioner in Jenkins, who was shot and wounded by a police officer,
brought suit under section 1983. He alleged a violation of his
fourth amendment rights. Reversing the holding below, the court
found that there was a constitutional injury in the police intrusion upon petitioner's physical integrity. The court explained
that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
includes protection of an individual's physical integrity.26 Although the language employed by the Jenkins court is arguably
broad enough to apply to the facts of Maney, the Maney court's
reliance on it evidences a misconception of the constitutional
injury involved.
This reliance on Jenkins reflects the true legal basis for the
result reached by the Maney court. The beatings in Jenkins and
the repeated arrests in Maney are analogous in that the conduct
of the public officials in both cases was unconscionable. Although
policy considerations might favor a construction of the fourth
amendment which would effectively control such conduct, the
Supreme Court has yet to embrace such an approach. Even if one
accepts the proposition that the fourth amendment imposes a due
process-like restraint on police conduct, 27 the validity of the result
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

315 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1963).
Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 773 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312, 314 (10th Cir. 1963).
424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1232.
Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The petitioner sought to have his
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in Maney is not free from doubt.
A careful analysis of the facts of the case reveals the fourth
amendment analysis to be legally unsound. After the first arrest
in Milwaukee, the defendants received notice of Maney's wherea-

bouts. The court concluded that the defendants' failure to act
upon the notification raised the inference that they had decided

not to extradite." Although this is a reasonable inference, the fact
that the defendants did not extradite after the first arrest does
not speak to the reasonableness of that arrest. Thus, the court's
analysis would not support the conclusion that the plaintiff's
rights were violated prior to the second arrest.

As the Maney court noted, despite the failure of the Baton
Rouge officials to extradite after the first arrest, the NCIC entry

remained active and it was, therefore, "only a matter of time
until [Maney] would again be arrested .... -12The second
arrest occurred in October 1974. After the police had stopped him

for a minor traffic violation, Maney was again charged with being
a fugitive from justice and was incarcerated for 30 days. The
Baton Rouge officials indicated that they would forward the papers necessary for extradition but again failed to do so."°

The failure to delete the entry after the first arrest does not,
however, appear to be unreasonable within the meaning of the
Maney court's construction of Terry. The Baton Rouge officials
did not seek extradition after the first arrest because they lacked
sufficient evidence at that time. 3' The defendants apparently
conviction for the illegal possession of morphine reversed on the ground that the court
should have excluded the evidence obtained as a result of the pumping of his stomach.
The Supreme Court held that this police conduct violated the petitioner's rights under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and found that it "shocked the
conscience." Id. at 172. Holding that the states must pursue criminal prosecutions within
certain limitations, the Court stated:
Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining,
and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say
that convictions can not be brought by methods that offend "a sense of justice."
ICitation omitted.]
Id. at 173. The conduct at issue in Maney was not so offensive as to bring it within the
meaning of Rochin. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (thorough search
of individual incident to a lawful arrest not so extreme as to violate due process); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (police infiltration of drug-making operation and
provision of essential ingredient not violative of due process); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (withdrawal of blood upon suspicion of driving while intoxicated held not
to offend due process).
28. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 773 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 765.
31. Id.
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cured this deficiency during the period between the first and
second arrests. 2 In light of the court's specific finding that there
was no intentional bad faith or harassment,3 it is difficult to see
how the court's conclusion that the defendants' conduct
"evince[d] a reckless and callous disregard for plaintiff's constitutional rights ' 34 is applicable to the failure to delete the NCIC
entry after the first arrest or to the second arrest itself.
Despite their failure to act on the information supplied after
the second arrest, the defendants again neglected to remove the
fugitive from justice entry and subjected Maney to a third arrest.
This arrest, which occurred in Plattsburgh, New York, was
clearly unreasonable in terms of the Maney court's construction
of Wolf, Terry, and Jenkins.35 Thus, a rigorous application of the
court's reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the cause of
action did not arise until the third arrest. If the court had engaged
in a careful analysis of the facts, however, it would have been
forced to dismiss the suit since venue did not lie with respect to
the incidents which occurred in New York. 36
The ill-fit of the fourth amendment analysis applied by the
Maney court suggests the application of an alternative
analysis-one focusing on the invasion of the individual's constitutional right to privacy which results from a confrontation with
governmental computers. Under this analysis, Maney's constitutional rights were violated once it became clear that the authorities lacked sufficient evidence or intent to prosecute but nevertheless continued the NCIC entry. The original entry and subsequent failure to delete constituted an invasion of the plaintiff's
constitutional right to privacy. The three arrests should be properly viewed as consequential injuries which give rise to a claim
for compensatory damages. The analysis of the Maney court concentrated on the plaintiff's arrests in determining whether there
was a constitutional injury. Instead, the court should have focused on the initial governmental intrusion.
Although the bases of the constitutional right to privacy have
32. Id.
33. Id. at 772.
34. Id.
35. After the plaintiff's third arrest, defendant Chaffin informed the Plattsburgh,
New York, District Attorney that he would not forward extradition papers. Id. at 765-66.
Thus, it is beyond dispute that the defendants had decided not to prosecute.
36. See note 7 supra.
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not been definitively articulated, the existence and protections
of the right have been consistently recognized in three areas:
sexual privacy,37 fourth amendment search and seizure," and informational misuse. 9 It is the analysis developed in the context
of misuse of information cases that is most relevant here.
Menard v. Mitchell' and Tarlton v. Saxbe 4' dealt with the
problem of FBI dissemination of arrest records. 2 In each case the
37. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
38. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
39. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.
Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498
F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
While this article was going to press, the Supreme Court, in a surprising decision,
Paul v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976), held that a claim for injury to
reputation committed under color of state law was not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In reversing the determination of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Paul v. Davis, 505
F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974), the Court held that the respondent's appearance in a "shoplifter
flyer" constituted nothing more than "a claim for defamation under state law" which was
not altered by the fact that the flyer was prepared by a state official. Paul v. Davis, 44
U.S.L.W. 4337, 4339 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
The Court held that "the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither 'liberty'
nor 'property' guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law," id. at
4343, and thus found it necessary to consider the respondent's alternative theory of recovery not reached by the court of appeals. His "complaint alleged a violation of [his] 'right
to privacy guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.'"
Id. The Court rejected this argument by holding that the disclosure of the fact of his arrest
on a shoplifting charge did not come within the "zones of privacy" previously recognized
by the Court. Id.
Respondent's privacy claim in Davis was based on the stigma resulting from the
State's publication of the fact of his arrest. Although Money is distinguishable in that
Maney's injury-being subjected to repeated arrests and deprivations of liberty-is both
more real and substantial in constitutional terms, the Court's language in Davis is disturbingly broad. In his dissent, Justice Brennan strongly disagreed with the majority's holding,
and noted that "the potential of [this] decision is frightening for a free people." Id. at
4346. But more importantly in terms of the Money decision, Justice Brennan referred to
the effect of the majority opinion in Davis on the developing body of case law pertaining
to informational misuse, and expressed his "fear that after today's decision, these nascent
doctrines will never have the opportunity for full growth and analysis." Id. at 4350 n.18.
40. 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Since the district court and the court
of appeals considered different issues, the opinion of each will be treated separately.
41. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
42. It should be emphasized that the Menard and Tarlton decisions involved the
FBI's Identification Division while Money concerned the FBI's operation of the NCIC, a
very different type of storage system. The "NCIC appears designed for rapid reference to
specific current information while the Identification Division . . . is [designed] to store
information more static in nature." United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (D.
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court was concerned with the potential for misuse of a legitimate
law enforcement system.
In Menard v. Mitchell, 3 decided in 1971, the District Court
for the District of Columbia considered a suit brought to compel
the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI to remove certain information from FBI criminal identification files. Plaintiff
Menard sought removal of his fingerprints and the accompanying
notation of an arrest without prosecution. Examining Menard's
assertion of an invasion of his constitutional right to privacy resulting from the maintenance and potential dissemination of his
record, the district court noted that "[t]hroughout the years
Courts have sought to preserve a citizen's right to privacy against
changes in our culture and developing modes of governmental
regulation."" The court also observed that:45
[T]echnological advances ... facilitate massive accumulation
and ready regurgitation of far-flung data ... [and] emphasize
a pressing need to preserve and to redefine aspects of the right
of privacy to insure the basic freedoms guaranteed by this democracy.
The district court in Menard determined that the government must carry the burden of maintaining "a proper
equilibrium between acquisition of information and the necessity
to safeguard privacy."46 The court's consideration of the conflict
between individual rights and society's need for efficient law enforcement prompted the observation that the FBI's identification
system was "out of effective control. 4 7 As a result, the court held
Nev. 1975). A reasonable inference would be that the potential for misuse is even greater
in the operation of the NCIC with its wider use and accessibility.
43. 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
44. Id. at 725. Plaintiff argued that:
[Iln the absence of a conviction, the maintenance and use of his arrest record
for any purpose whatsoever violates several constitutional guarantees-the presumption of innocence, due process, the right to privacy, and the freedom from
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 724.
45. Id. at 725.
46. Id. at 726. The court noted:
While conduct against the state may properly subject an individual to limitations upon his future freedom within tolerant limits, accusations not proven,
charges made without adequate supporting evidence when tested by the judicial
process . . . should not be indiscriminately broadcast under governmental auspices.
Id. at 725.
47. Id. at 727. The court also discussed the necessity of "adequate sanctions and
administrative safeguards," and the need for legislative guidance in the area. Id.
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that the FBI was "without authority to disseminate arrest records
outside the Federal Government for employment, licensing or
related purposes ....

''48

With respect to the use of the same records for law enforcement purposes, however, the Menard court reached a different
result. Here the court concluded that the balance favored the
government's interest in facilitating the operations of the criminal justice system.49 Additionally, the court concluded that the
individual plaintiff would be afforded due process protections in
this setting so that any misuse would be checked by judicial
action. ' " The Menard court held that dissemination outside the
federal government, if limited to law enforcement purposes, was
permissible; expungement was therefore denied."
Menard appealed from the order of the district court insofar
as it had sanctioned retention of arrest records. On appeal, the
plaintiff argued that the mere retention of his records violated his
constitutional rights. 2 The court avoided the constitutional issues and decided the case on statutory grounds.

3

It concluded

that the plaintiff had alleged a "cognizable legal injury" despite
the fact that he could not "point with mathematical certainty to
the exact consequences. . . ,,51 The court, therefore, ordered the
removal of Menard's records from the FBI's centralized criminal
files" Underlying the court's decision was the recognition of the
48. Id.
49. Id.
5o. Id.
51. Id. at 728. The collateral issue of the federal government's use of arrest records
for governmental employment was held to be "a proper exercise of the President's responsibilities in the name of national security." Id. at 727. The court noted in dictum, however,
that this procedure should be reevaluated in the light of "fair play" and suggested that
all applicants for federal employment receive a copy of their record so they can "correct
or explain any data therein contained." Id. at 728.
52. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Menard alleged that he
was subject to "harsh penalties without being accorded due process of law," denied equal
protection, and subjected to a violation of his right of privacy. Id.
53. Id. at 1029-30.
54. Id. at 1023, citing Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55. 498 F.2d 1017, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court found that the presence of the
records in the neutral noncriminal files was permissible provided that there was no reference of any kind to their criminal origin. Id. The reason for the distinction was obvious;
the potential for, and effect of, misuse in the former was far greater than in the latter.
In its inquiry into the necessity for maintenance of the arrest records, the court
examined the unique role of the FBI in the process. The court of appeals reversed the
decision below and held that the FBI was not "a mere passive recipient" of information
received from others, but, instead, more of a "step-up transformer that puts into the
system a capacity for both good and harm." Id. at 1026. The FBI's retention of the records
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potential for misuse of the informational system and the necessity
of deterring such activity. 6
In Tarlton v. Saxbe57 appeal was brought from a district
court order dismissing a pro se complaint on the ground that it
failed to state a cause of action. The case concerned the extent
to which the FBI has a duty "to take reasonable measures to
safeguard the accuracy of information in its criminal files which
is subject to dissemination." '
Tarlton alleged injury from the existence of several arrest
entries in the FBI's "criminal file" which failed to indicate any
ultimate disposition, and other entries which concerned convictions allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.5 9
He asserted that this incomplete and inaccurate information led
to a denial of parole from federal prison and claimed that further
dissemination would result in similar injury. 0
In considering the complaint, the court noted that the case
involved "a particularly sensitive area of law, concerning the developing relationship between values of individual privacy and
the record-keeping functions of the executive branch."', As in
Menard, the court in Tarlton was concerned with the potential
for misuse of the FBI's Identification System and underscored the
need for guidelines:62
[G]overnment collection and dissemination of inaccurate criminal information without reasonable precautions to ensure accuracy could induce a levelling conformity inconsistent with the
diversity of ideas and manners which has traditionally characafter learning that Menard's arrest was "purely fortuitous," id. at 1027, was a direct

violation of its duty to maintain and disseminate criminal identification records, a duty
which involves the "responsibility to discharge this function reliably and responsibly and

without unnecessary harm to the individuals whose rights have been invaded." Id. at 1026.
56. In Menard suit was brought against the federal agency, not the local police.

Menard argued that the FBI was liable based on the fact that the agency maintained and
disseminated the inaccurate records. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The Menard court noted that it would have to deal with a number of issues to

determine the liability of the FBI for dissemination. Implying that it was not prepared to
hold the federal agency responsible, the court decided that expungement proceedings
should properly be "maintained against the local law enforcement agencies involved." Id.
at 1025.
57. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
58. Id. at 1121.
59. Id. at 1120.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1121.
62. Id. at 1124. This concern was articulated by Judge Gerhard Gesell in Menard v.
Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726 (D.D.C. 1971).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

11

HofstraLaw
Law Review,
Art. 12
Hofstra
ReviewVol. 4, Iss. 3 [1976],
[Vol. 4, 1976]

terized our national life and found legal protection in the First
Amendment.
Although the court recognized the value of the system, it was
equally cognizant of its potential dangers. The court was particularly sensitive to the possibility that criminal files might be disseminated in the absence of a legitimate purpose. It was the
likelihood of future abuse that demanded the court's most serious
attention. 3
The essential question concerned who should have the burden of ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the system. The
Tarlton court concluded that the FBI could not extricate itself
from responsibility by claiming that it was a "mere passive recipient" of information." The court held that the FBI was, in fact,
an active link in the informational flow. Because of practical
limitations-administrative burdens, federalism, and efficiency-the Tarlton court decided that the responsibility was
more appropriately placed with the local agency. 5 The court
noted, however, that the FBI was responsible for performing a
duty of inquiry to be evaluated by reference to a standard of
reasonableness in light of the factual setting.6
The argument for application of the analysis developed in
the informational misuse cases to the Maney facts is compelling.
The same issues upon which the Menard and Tarlton courts focused are involved in Maney. The potential for abuse of the NCIC
Wanted Persons File is evident from the facts as outlined by the
Maney court." As a consequence of the defendant's misuse of the
computerized network, Maney was subjected to the type of governmental interference and constitutional injury with which the
Menard and Tarlton courts were concerned. It was not the separate arrests or seizures which represented the constitutionally
improper governmental action, but rather the initial unjustified
NCIC entry and its subsequent maintenance.
63. The court referred to the dissemination of "inaccurate criminal records without
reasonable precautions to safeguard the record's accuracy." Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d
1116, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The FBI did not assert that its dissemination was justified
by a legitimate purpose, but rather that considerations of federalism and administrative
convenience warranted the allocation of the burden of safeguarding accuracy to the local
agency. Id.
64. Id. at 1126, quoting Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see
note 55 supra.
65. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 1128-29.
67. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 764-66 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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Maney, like the plaintiff in Tarlton, did not allege constitutionally impermissible conduct on the part of the arresting
agency, but rather on the part of those who made the arrests
possible-the Baton Rouge officials. The defendant authorities
who were responsible for entering the data in the NCIC in Maney
are in an analogous position to those making the initial arrests in
Menard and Tarlton-the local law enforcement agency. In
Menard and Tarlton it was held that the local agency was appropriately saddled with the burden of ensuring that accurate
information be introduced and maintained in the system. Thus,
the burden of properly using the NCIC must be imposed on the
Baton Rouge authorities.
The Maney court's analysis fails to identify correctly the
constitutional wrong. By failing to thoroughly analyze the facts
and concentrating on the resulting damage-the arrests-the
court was forced to apply an imperfect fourth amendment analysis.
The district court's determination that the defendants' conduct "evince[d] a reckless and callous disregard for plaintiff's
rights""8 brings the case within the principles outlined by Judge
David Bazelon in Tarlton. Significantly, according to NCIC policy,69 only the contributing agency could delete the entry. If the
defendants neglected to remove the information, the entry would
continue to circulate throughout the country and would subject
Maney to the possibility of continual arrests.
The injury suffered by Maney preceded the separate arrests.
The transmitting authorities lacked either sufficient evidence to
extradite or the prosecutorial intent to do so. It was this conduct
which violated Maney's constitutional right to privacy.
The Maney decision is important because it further underscores the necessity to control the government's use of computers
in law enforcement operations. More significant, however, is the
court's recognition of its role in providing remedies for those individuals injured as a result of the misuse of these devices. 70 The
Maney court sanctioned both legal and equitable relief and thus
spoke to two overriding concerns-compensation for past wrongs
and deterrence of future abuses.
The NCIC represents an effort by the federal government to
68. Id. at 772.

69.

FEDERAL DATA BANKS,

supra note 1, at 2218.

70. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971).
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assist local law enforcement agencies. Federal involvement must
be accompanied by effective supervision. The development of a
reasoned constitutional analysis will help make judicial supervision possible until effective legislative guidelines and restraints
are developed. 7
Lawrence N. Mullman
71. See Comment, Protectionof Privacy of Computerized Records in the National
Crime Information Center, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 594-614 (1974).
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